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Abstract. Along with the extensive applications of CNN models for
classification, there has been a growing requirement for their robustness
against adversarial examples. In recent years, many adversarial defense
methods have been introduced, but most of them have to sacrifice classi-
fication accuracy on clean samples to achieve better robustness of CNNs.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework to improve robustness and
meanwhile retain accuracy of given classification CNN models, termed
as RAIN, which consists of two conjugate modules: structured random-
ization (SRd) and detail generation (DG). Specifically, the SRd module
randomly downsamples and shifts the input, which can destroy the struc-
ture of adversarial perturbations so as to improve the model robustness.
However, such operations also incur accuracy drop inevitably. Through
our empirical study, the resultant image of the SRd module suffers loss
of high-frequency details that are crucial for model accuracy. To rem-
edy the accuracy drop, RAIN couples a deep super-resolution model
as the DG module for recovering rich details in the resultant image.
We evaluate RAIN on STL10 and the ImageNet datasets, and exper-
iment results well demonstrate its great robustness against adversarial
examples as well as comparable classification accuracy to non-robustified
counterparts on clean samples. Our framework is simple, effective and
substantially extends the application of adversarial defense techniques to
realistic scenarios where clean and adversarial samples are mixed.
Keywords: Deep Neural Networks, Adversarial Robustness
1 Introduction
In the past decades, CNN based classification models have been successfully
applied to a variety of important systems such as finance [4], security [30] and
driving assistants [27]. In these real-world applications, system safety is often
deemed to enjoy higher superiority over the performance. However, CNN mod-
els are revealed to be highly vulnerable to adversarial examples [31,3] — even
adding a few visually imperceptible perturbations could easily fool CNNs to make
fatal predictions. With the ever growing applications of CNNs, their safety issue
becomes more significant and needs more attention.
? Equal contribution.
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Fig. 1: The pipeline of our proposed RAIN. The input image xi first goes through
structured randomization (SRd) module to be randomly shifted and randomly down-
sampled. This module enhances the robustness but leads to accuracy drop. Then, the
downsampled image x↓si is sent to detail generation (DG) module to recover details for
remedying accuracy. Lastly, the resultant image x↓s↑i is fed into the given CNN
To enhance adversarial robustness of CNNs, lots of adversarial defense ap-
proaches have been developed which can be roughly divided into three categories:
input transformation, adversarial training, and randomization. The input trans-
formation [14,36,17] methods transform input images to cause obfuscated gradi-
ents or project adversarial examples onto clean data manifold. Such methods are
not universal, and can be evaded by adaptive attacks [2]. The second category,
adversarial training methods such as [24,35], achieve outstanding robustness by
training CNNs from scratch with both clean images and augmented adversarial
examples. However, the data augmentation also consumes extensive comput-
ing resource compared to regular training. The randomization methods [34,28]
achieve a balance between robustness and implementation cost by adding ran-
domness to either input or DNN model architectures to mitigate adversarial
effects. Due to randomness, the path of generating gradients varies from that of
predicting adversarial examples with a high probability, thus the randomization
modules mitigate the adversarial effects. Unfortunately, all the above mentioned
defense methods have to pay the price of accuracy drop for enhanced robust-
ness [29,37].
In this work, we propose a Robust and Accurate classIfication Network
(RAIN) targeting at better robustness and meanwhile good accuracy. Our frame-
work contains two modules: a structured randomization (SRd) module and a
detail generation (DG) module. The SRd module contains random pooling and
random shifting, which downsamples and shifts input images both in random
procedures to destroy the adversarial perturbations. However, the added ran-
domness also deducts the accuracy on clean images as in other defense methods
[34,28]. We compare the images processed by the SRd module with the original
ones, and find the processed images are more smooth and tend to lack rich high-
frequency details. We further conduct empirical study to show removal of such
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high-frequency details worsens the accuracy greatly. In view of such findings, we
remedy the accuracy drop by recovering the high-frequency details of processed
images. This is achieved by a detail generation (DG) module that implements
a deep super-resolution model. The pipeline of our proposed RAIN is shown in
Figure 1.
We evaluate the RAIN framework on STL10 and ImageNet datasets. Specif-
ically, it achieves robustness of 68.6% under FGSM attack, and concurrently re-
tains accuracy of 93.3% on ImageNet, outperforming the existing randomization-
based baselines, and also maintaining the highest accuracy among all defense
baselines.
To summarize, we make the following contributions in this work:
1) We propose a simple and practical framework, termed as RAIN, to help
CNNs achieve enhanced robustness and meanwhile maintain high accuracy.
The RAIN could be dropped in any given CNNs for enhancing their perfor-
mance.
2) We introduce two simple yet effective structured randomization based de-
fense methods. Besides serving as components of the RAIN framework, they
are also of independent interest and can be integrated with other defense
methods to improve their robustness further.
3) We reveal the origin of accuracy deduction through our proposed randomiza-
tion and develop a corresponding solution to remedy the accuracy deduction.
The experiments verify the compensation of our solution to the accuracy.
2 Preliminaries on Adversarial Robustness
In this section, we specify the notations, goals and capabilities of the adver-
sary in our defense scenarios. We provide an overview of adversarial attack, and
evaluation metrics of adversarial robustness. Suppose we are given a dataset
D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 with samples from c categories, where xi ∈ Rh×w×3 is an RGB
color image and yi ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , c} is its label. We train a CNN classification
model, denoted as C(x) : Rh×w×3 → Y. Let L(C(x), y) be the loss function
for evaluating the model prediction C(x) w.r.t. the label y, which is typically a
cross-entropy one.
2.1 Attack Models
Given an input image x from category y, adversarial attack is to craft an ad-
versarial example xadv = x+ δ that causes prediction error of the classification
model, i.e., C(xadv) 6= y. Here δ is the additive and imperceptible adversarial
perturbation generated by certain adversarial attack methods A(x). We take
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16] for illustration, which is an effective
one-step adversarial attack method. The adversarial examples are crafted as
xadv = A(x) = x+ α · sign(∇xL(C(x), y)), (1)
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where α is the step size that controls the magnitude of the added noise. FGSM
is a representative one among gradient-based attack methods [12,6,25] which are
based on the information of back-propageted gradients on the inputs to craft the
perturbations.
For a fair comparison of different defense methods, a perturbation budget 
is specified so that any adversarial example must satisfy ||xadv−x||p ≤ . In this
paper, we only consider l∞-norm with the perturbation budget  to define the
adversary’s capability.
We first consider a white-box ensemble-pattern attack [34] in robustness eval-
uation. The adversary is aware of the given CNN model C(x) and the defense
module, as well as the internal gradients of them. The adversary can craft ad-
versarial examples with the back-propagated gradients except for designing any
adaptive attack modification. Such an attack scenario is more difficult to defend
and thus, many previous defense methods only reported results under simpler
vanilla attack scenarios [26,28]. Another attack scenario we consider is a score-
based black-box attack, which only allows the adversary to access the logits
output, and the accessing times will be restricted to a given maximum number.
2.2 Evaluation Metrics of Adversarial Robustness
A widely used metric to evaluate robustness is the prediction accuracy over the
adversarial examples generated by certain attack methods [11]. Here, we only
consider samples which have been classified correctly by the given CNN model
before getting attacked. Formally, given a CNN model C(x), we randomly collect
a robustness test set, T = {(xj , yj)}Mj=1, where each element (xj , yj) ∈ D and
C(xj) = yj . For a certain attack method A(x) with the perturbation budget ,
the robustness is evaluated as
R(C, A) = 1
M
M∑
j=1
1 [C(A(xj)) = yj ] . (2)
The above equation calculates the accuracy of a given CNN model C(x) on
the adversarial examples crafted by a given adversarial attack method A(x)
with perturbation budget . Note, the given CNN model C(x) could also be a
defending model for robustness evaluation.
3 Randomization for Robustness
We propose a structured randomization module that consists of two operations,
random pooling and random shifting, to defend against adversarial examples. In
this section, we provide details of the two operations and reveal the mechanism
behind their effectiveness. Lastly, we report robustness evaluation results of the
two operations.
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3.1 Structured Randomization
We first introduce random pooling and random shifting operations in detail.
Both of them can damage the crafting of adversarial perturbations and enhance
robustness.
Random Shifting. CNN is known to be almost shift-invariant due to its pooling
and convolution layers, which means a small input shifts seldom affect the correct
prediction of CNN. The shift-invariance of CNN inspires us to add randomness
to CNN through shifting inputs slightly and randomly.
We design a random shifting operation over the input images before feeding
them to the given CNN models. The input image is shifted differently for each
inference as follows. First two shift values ∆h,∆w are randomly sampled from
a uniform distribution, where ∆h ∼ U(−hp, hp), ∆w ∼ U(−wp,wp). Here, the
magnitude of∆h,∆w is the number of shifted pixels, with sign indicating shifting
direction; h,w are the width and height of the input images, and p is a predefined
proportion and hence p < 0.5. Usually a very small p is enough and we use
p = 0.05 in our experiments. Then, the random shifting operation shifts the
input image by ∆h vertically and by ∆w horizontally.
Fig. 2: The demonstration of random shifting.
Left shows the original image; middle and right
are random shifted images with p = 0.05 and
0.25 respectively. We use p = 0.05 in our mod-
ule, which causes little impact on predicting the
image correctly
Figure 2 demonstrates our
random shifting operation.
Consequently, randomness is
added to CNN, which miti-
gates the adversarial effect of
adversarial examples.
Random Pooling. In ad-
dition to random shifting,
we also introduce a random
pooling operation to improve
the robustness further. For
any input image, the random
pooling operation divides the
image into non-overlap 2 × 2
patches completely. Next, it
randomly picks one pixel from each patch with the uniform probability. The
resultant images, denoted by x↓, are downsampled with factor= 0.5 into the size
of 12h × 12w × 3. For the CNN classifier trained on the original dataset D, we
upsample x↓ into the original size h×w× 3 for prediction. In specific, the bicu-
bic upsampling was applied here firstly. (We replace bicubic upsampling with
the detail generation module(DG) in section 5.) We use superscripts ↓ and ↑
to represent the downsampling and upsampling operations respectively, and the
upsampled image is denoted as x↑.
Implementation details of the random shifting and random pooling are sum-
marized in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Structured randomization
Input: Input image x, CNN model C(x), random Shifting maximum proportion p;
1: x = Random Pooling(x)
2: x = Random Shift(x, p)
3: x = Upsample(x, factor = 2)
4: ypred = softmax(C(x))
Output: Prediction ypred.
5: function Random Pooling(x)
6: for i in (0, d 1
2
he − 1) and j in (0, d 1
2
we − 1) do
7: Randomly initialize ∆i ∼ U([0, 1]),∆j ∼ U([0, 1])
8: x↓(i, j) = x(min(2i+∆i, h− 1),min(2j +∆j,w − 1))
return x↓
9: function Random Shift(x, p)
10: for is in (0,h− 1) and js in (0,w − 1) do
11: Assert p < 0.5
12: Randomly initialize ∆h ∼ U(−hp, hp),∆w ∼ U(−wp,wp)
13: i ≡ (is +∆h) mod h
14: j ≡ (js +∆w) mod w
15: xs(is, js) = x(i, j)
return xs
3.2 Randomization Brings Robustness
As we conjecture, that randomization improves robustness is due to the caused
misalignment between the fixed activation path of adversarial perturbations and
the random inference path, which is analysed as below.
Given a clean image xi, when an adversary computes the gradient for crafting
the adversarial perturbation, the gradient is generated by δi1 = ∇xC(x)|x=xsi1 ,
where xsi1 is the random shifted version of xi w.r.t. ∆hi1 and ∆wi1. The infer-
ence path for generating gradients δi1 is denoted by (∆hi1,∆wi1). Then, for the
prediction of the crafted adversarial example xi + δi1, the classifier CNN follows
the inference path (∆hi2,∆wi2). Thus, the most adversarial perturbation cor-
responding to the inference path (∆hi2, ∆wi2) changes to δi2 = ∇xC(x)|x=xsi2 ,
where xsi2 represents the random shifted version of xi with ∆hi2 and ∆wi2. The
probability that δi1 is the same with the most adversarial perturbation δi2 is as
low as Pr{∆hi1 = ∆hi2, ∆wi1 = ∆wi2} = 1/(2ph · 2pw). Thus, randomization
brings the robustness against adversarial attack.
Similarly in the random pooling operation, the probability that pooling posi-
tions selected for generating gradients are the same with those in the adversarial
example prediction path is also as low as Pr{δi1 = δi2} = (1/4)h/2·w/2. The
combination of two randomization operations makes the given CNN very robust
against gradient-based adversarial attack. We conduct experiments to examine
the robustness of this structured randomization module, and also attempt to
find the best order of implementing the three steps including random shifting,
random pooling and upsampling.
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Table 1: Robustness evaluation experiments of three orders of steps. “P”,“B”
and “S” stand for random pooling, bicubic upsampling and random shifting re-
spectively. We evaluate the robustness on STL10 and ImageNet Datasets against
the FGSM and PGD attacks. All three orders are more robust than the vanilla
CNN model. Among them, “P S B” order achieves strongest robustness
Accuracy Robustness
STL10 Clean Images FGSM-8/255 PGD-16/255
Original model 1.000 0.090 0.000
P B S 0.810 0.710 0.227
P S B 0.824 0.720 0.287
S P B 0.806 0.712 0.270
ImageNet Clean Images FGSM-8/255 PGD-16/255
Original model 1.000 0.197 0.000
P B S 0.642 0.506 0.121
P S B 0.643 0.573 0.252
S P B 0.639 0.563 0.244
3.3 Robustness Evaluation Experiments
Setup. The two randomization operations and the upsampling have three pos-
sible orders as listed in Table 1. Note, the upsampling has to be placed behind
the random pooling. Here we conduct robustness verification experiments on the
three orders. For reference, we also conduct robustness verification experiments
on vanilla CNN model. The robustness is evaluated under FGSM attack with
 = 8/255, and PGD attack with  = 16/255, stepsize = 1/255, iteration= 40.
We use STL10 [8] and ImageNet [9] datasets here for evaluation. The evalua-
tion metrics of robustness are formulated in Section 2.2. We evaluate robustness
by testing the prediction accuracy on a predefined robustness set T . The test
set T contains 5, 000 samples from testing set which are predicted correctly by
the given CNN model. The experiments in the following sections also follow
the same settings if without any specification. We aim to verify the robustness
and find the best order for the three steps,random shifting, random pooling and
upsampling.
We use both well-trained Resnet [18] in STL10 and ImageNet datasets for
robustness verification experiments. The Resnet on STL10 dataset contains 11
convolutional layers and 1 fully-connected layer. The Resnet50 on ImageNet
dataset consists of 5 stages each with a convolution and identity block. The
detailed architectures of the used Resnets are given in the appendix.
Results. The experiment results are listed in Table 1, from which we can find
that all the combinations achieve more than 50% robustness under the FGSM
attack. This verifies the effectiveness of randomization in enhancing model ro-
bustness. Furthermore, we find the order “P S B” achieves the best robustness
performance for more than 60% under the FGSM attack and 20% under the
PGD attack. As a reference, the vanilla CNN model only achieves 19.7% and
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0.0% robustness performance under the FGSM and PGD attacks. This is a sig-
nificant improvement on robustness of our proposed structured randomization
module compared to the vanilla CNN model.
4 Analyzing Accuracy Drop from Robustness
Even with the proposed structured randomization that enhances robustness
against adversarial examples, the accuracy of defense models on clean images
is only around 80% on STL10 and around 64% on ImageNet, much worse than
100% accuracy of the vanilla CNN model on clean images. There is a significant
drop in accuracy due to the pursuit of model robustness. In this section, we try
to dig the root of such drop and then mitigate it.
Fig. 3: The original image, the resultant im-
age processed SRd and bicubic upsampling and
the difference of them. The second row is the
frequency spectrum of the first row images.
The centroid of the frequency spectrum is the
zero-frequency components. From the difference
of frequency spectrum, the processed image is
damaged more in the four corners, which are the
high-frequency components
To find the reasons of
the accuracy drop, we com-
pare the original images with
the images processed after
the structured randomization
module, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The left image has
been downsampled, random
shifted and upsampled in
the structured randomization
module. Compared to the
right original image, it is ob-
vious that the processed im-
ages are more smooth and
lack of details. The details
of an image are usually the
high-frequency components of
an image, and the frequency
spectrum of Figure 3 veri-
fies that point. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the accu-
racy drop may come from
loss of high-frequency compo-
nents. We then conduct ex-
periments to study the contri-
bution of high-frequency com-
ponents to the accuracy of a well-trained CNN model, to verify our hypothesis.
Setup. The test datasets and the corresponding trained CNN models we eval-
uate here are the same as Section 3.3 indicated.
We conduct the experiments in an ablative manner to examine the impact of
losing high-frequency details on accuracy. We continually decrease the threshold
for removing the high-frequency components from the image, and keep other
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factors the same, to find the change of accuracy. The following are the steps in
details. We first transfer the input image into the frequency domain by FFT:
z = F(x) where z is the image in frequency domain with complex values, of the
same size h×w× 3 as x. Then, we remove the high-frequency components from
z beyond the given threshold r, the resultant spectrum is:
z′(µ, ν) =
{
0, if
d((µ,ν),(cµ,cν))
1
2
√
h2+w2
≥ r;
z(µ, ν), otherwise.
(3)
Here d(·, ·) is the Euclidean distance, (µ, ν) is the indexing in frequency do-
main and (cµ, cν) is the indexing of the centroid, which represents the element
with 0 frequency. (cµ, cν) will be the same for the images with same size in
frequency domain. Then, we calculate the energy of the resultant frequency
spectrum. The energy E(·) over a spectrum z is computed by:
E(z) =
∫
µ
∫
ν
|z(µ, ν)|2dµdν. (4)
0.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.0
Threshold r
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Impact of High-Fre Components
STL10 Accuracy
STL10 E(z′)/E(z).
ImageNet Accuracy
ImageNet E(z′)/E(z).
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
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E(
z′
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Fig. 4: On both two datasets, we can see
that the remaining energy E(z′) decreases
when more high-freq components are re-
moved (smaller r). Even the energy of the
filtered spectrum is controlled to be the
same with the origin, removing high-freq
components still impairs the test accuracy
Noting that removing the high-
frequency components will lead to the
loss of corresponding spectral densi-
ties, thus the energy over the fre-
quency spectrum also decreases, i.e.
E(z′) < E(z). Next, to avoid the in-
fluence of energy loss, we uniformly
scale up z′ by
√
E(z)/E(z′) so that
it holds the same energy as the origi-
nal spectrum’s. Lastly, we could com-
pare the impact on the accuracy of
removing different proportion of high-
frequency components fairly.
Results. As Figure 4 shows, re-
moving high-frequency components
does reduce the accuracy significantly.
Along with decreasing the threshold
r, the accuracy drops very faster in
both datasets even after holding the
energy to be constant. These results verify that the damaged details after the
structured randomization modules is an important factor leading to the accuracy
drop.
As the destroyed details is an essential reason causing the drop of accuracy,
we are motivated to develop an approach to recover the details and hence obtain
a robust and accurate defense framework.
10 F. Author et al.
5 RAIN: Robust and Accurate Defense Network
Based on the experiments in the previous sections, we can see that the structured
randomization module (SRd) in our RAIN framework can enhance the robust-
ness of CNN models substantially on both STL10 and ImageNet datasets, but at
the price of deducted accuracy. Besides, the damaged details caused by the SRd
module are proved to be the important factors leading to the drop in accuracy.
To remedy such accuracy drop, we introduce a detail generation (DG) module,
which is detailed in Section 5.1. We replace bicubic upsampling in Algorithm 1
with the DG module to propose the complete framework of RAIN in this sec-
tion. Then we conduct experiments to show our proposed framework contributes
to better robustness with less sacrificing accuracy, against both white-box and
black-box attacks.
5.1 Architectures of RAIN
Detail Generation. In our RAIN framework, to remedy accuracy drop due
to pursuit of better robustness with the structured randomization (SRd) mod-
ule, we apply a detail generation (DG) module. This module is implemented
with a Super Resolution (SR) model to generate the details of the images pro-
cessed by the structured randomization module. SR models are able to upsample
low-resolution images and to enhance details [10]. The deep-learning-based SR
models, such as EDSR [23], achieve impressive performance in Super-Resolution
tasks. Therefore, we replace the bicubic upsampling operation with a deep-
learning-based SR model, viz., the EDSR.
In order to show the effectiveness of EDSR for generating details, a certain
image xi is processed respectively by the SRd + bicubic pipeline and the SRd
+ EDSR pipeline. The resultant images are denoted by x↓s↑bi and x
↓s↑sr
i . In
Figure. 5a, we compare the spectrum maps of the two resultant images. Given
a spectrum z(µ, ν), the spectral density at certain frequency q is calculated by
D(q) = log
 ∑√
µ2+ν2=q/2
√
h2+w2
z(µ, ν)2
 .
We implement Fourier transform over x↓s↑bi and x
↓s↑sr
i . The spectral density D(q)
in terms of frequency q is plotted in Figure. 5a. We can see that the spectrum of
x↓s↑sri contains stronger high-freq components in comparison to x
↓s↑b
i . Thereby,
EDSR enhances high-freq details in the resultant images.
Overall Pipeline. The whole pipeline of the RAIN is as follows: for a given
well-trained classification model C(·), RAIN first processes the images through
the random pooling and the random shifting operations. Then, the well-trained
EDSR model upsamples the images back to the regular size and enriches the
details. Afterwards, the resultant images are fed to the given CNN classifier
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Fig. 5: Analysis of the effects of RAIN in processing images. (a) Spectrum com-
parison on the images processed by EDSR and Bicubic. (b) Comparison on fea-
ture maps from the Res3a block for the vanilla adversarial images (middle) and
the image processed by RAIN (right). The strong responses of some locations
have been alleviated. The adversarial images, originally recognized wrongly, are
classified correctly after RAIN
C(·). Lastly, to better generate the detail that are useful to C(·), a few fine-
tuning operations for the parameters of the SR model are performed to better
remedy the drop of accuracy.
5.2 Robustness to White-box Attacks
We conduct experiments to compare our RAIN with other adversarial defense
methods under white-box attacks.
Experiment Proposal We compare our proposed RAIN with other baselines
under white-box adversarial attack. The experiment settings and evaluation met-
rics are the same as the section 3.3 indicates. The EDSR model contains 16
residual blocks, 64 filters and are trained in DIV2K dataset [1]. The robust-
ness are evaluated under FGSM attack with  = 8/255, and PGD attack with
 = 16/255, stepsize = 1/255, iteration= 40. We choose four recent baselines as
the benchmark of our evaluation. Two of the baselines are randomization-based
defense methods, Random-padding [34] and Pixel deflection[28]. The rest two are
adversarial-training based defense methods, adversarial training [24] and feature
denoising [35].
Experiment Results Table 2 shows the result of accuracy and robustness un-
der white-box attacks. Our proposed RAIN outperforms the other four baselines
both in accuracy (92.9%,93.3%) and robustness (74.5%,68.6%) under the FGSM
attack in both datasets. Although the two adversarial-training-based baselines
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Table 2: Robustness Evaluation of RAIN and baselines under white-box attacks
on STL10 and ImageNet datasets. The white-box attacks are end-to-end FGSM
attack with  = 8/255 and PGD attack with  = 16/255
Accuracy Robustness
STL10 Clean Images FGSM-8/255 PGD-16/255
Pixel Deflection [28] 0.883 0.286 0.065
Random Padding Resizing [34] 0.907 0.576 0.070
Adversarial Training [24] 0.705 0.592 0.649
Feature Denoising [35] 0.696 0.631 0.668
RAIN 0.929 0.745 0.237
ImageNet Clean Images FGSM-8/255 PGD-16/255
Pixel Deflection [28] 0.858 0.406 0.117
Random Padding Resizing [34] 0.928 0.644 0.154
Adversarial Training [24] 0.623 0.620 0.417
Feature Denoising [35] 0.653 0.648 0.455
RAIN 0.933 0.686 0.273
achieves best robustness under the PGD attack, they have much worse accu-
racy. More importantly, both adversarial-training-based baselines are trained
from scratch with adversarial examples crafted by the PGD attack with same
 = 16/255, which makes them more robust against iterative attack methods.
Figure 5 show the difference of feature map with and without RAIN for a given
CNN model. We can see that the RAIN mitigate the adversarial effect of mali-
cious examples.
5.3 Robustness to Black-box Attacks
We then compare our proposed RAIN with the baselines under black-box adver-
sarial attacks to test its robustness.
Experiment Proposal The experiments follow the same benchmark as the
white-box attack experiments in section 5.2 apart from the adversarial attack
methods. We select three black-box adversarial attack mehtod, ZOO [7] and NES
[19] to evaluate our defense approach RAIN. The perturbation budget  = 8/255
for all experiments under black-box adversarial attack.
Experiment Results Table 3 shows the result of accuracy and robustness
under black-box attacks. Similar to the experiment result in white-box attack.
Our propose RAIN achieved both highest robustness(91.2%,88.5%) among the
four baselines under FGSM attack in both datasets. The experiment results
verify that our proposed RAIN are robust under different adversarial attack
methods and different datasets. Last but not least, our proposed RAIN does
little harm to the accuracy with better robustness.
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Table 3: Robustness Evaluation of our proposed RAIN and baselines under
black-box attacks on STL10 and ImageNet datasets. All the black-box attacks
are with  = 8/255
Accuracy Robustness
STL10 Clean Images ZOO-8/255 NES-8/255
Pixel Deflection [28] 0.883 0.679 0.650
Random Padding Resizing [34] 0.907 0.854 0.873
Adversarial Training [24] 0.705 0.705 0.663
Feature Denoising [35] 0.696 0.621 0.594
RAIN 0.929 0.912 0.871
ImageNet Clean Images ZOO-8/255 NES-8/255
Pixel Deflection [28] 0.858 0.846 0.841
Random Padding Resizing [34] 0.928 0.867 0.881
Adversarial Training [24] 0.623 0.620 0.611
Feature Denoising [35] 0.653 0.663 0.641
RAIN 0.933 0.885 0.882
Discussion and Future Work We can see that the DG module increases the
spectral density in the high-frequency part, which is the procedure of generat-
ing details. Although the SR model in DG module shows good performance in
generating details, the DG module is not limited by SR model. Other generative
models such as GAN [22] and image enhancement [15] would also be suitable
for the detail generating. We will keep on investigating different solution for
remedying accuracy in the future.
6 Related Work
Adversarial Attack The investigation of adversarial examples was initiated
by [31], which shows well-crafted visually imperceptible perturbations could
cause prediction error of well-trained CNNs. Later, Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [16] was developed to compute such adversarial perturbations by con-
ducting gradient ascent on the original input. Following FGSM, several powerful
iterative adversarial attack methods, including DeepFool [25], PGD [24], MI-
FGSM [12] and C&W attack [6] were developed. All of them need to access
the internal back-propagated gradients on the original images to generate at-
tacks and thus are called the white-box attack methods. On the contrary, the
gradients are not available in the black-box settting. To generate attacking per-
turbations, ZOO [7] applies symmetric difference quotient [21] to estimate the
back-propagated gradient of each pixel according to the output change to the
queries. Though achieving comparable attack effect as many white-box methods,
it requires an excessive number of queries for gradients estimation. Recently,
many researchers focus on improving the black-box attack efficiency [33,20,13].
For instance, a natural evolution strategy (NES) was proposed by [21,19] to
estimate the back-propagated gradient on the original images.
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Adversarial Defense Randomization was introduced by [28] at inference to
obfuscate back-propagated gradients, by randomly sampling and replacing the
pixels with their neighbors. Besides, random resizing and padding layers [34] are
also able to interrupt the gradient computation and thus impair the attack meth-
ods. Such methods perform well against both white-box attack and black-box
attack methods [11]. The randomization-based defense methods do not require
training from scratch and can be applied to robustify any well-trained CNN
models directly and quickly. This is one of their significant advantages over
other defense methods. Adversarial training from scratch could improve more in
robustness against adversarial examples [24]. In addition to adversarial training,
a rencent work [35] proposes a feature denoising filter to improve the robustness
further, by non-local means [5] to denoise the perturbated features. Although
the adversarial training methods offer stronger robustness, they require much
longer training time and still suffer accuracy drop.
Image super-resolution (SR) issue is also explored to improve robustness of
CNN models but the relevant studies are very few. A recent work [26] uses SR to
upsample the adversarial examples into the natural image manifold and applies
wavelet denoising on upsampled examples for defense. However, the authors
only tested their method in black-box attack scenarios, where the SR model
is unknown to the adversary. Our experiments show their method is fragile in
the ensemble-pattern white-box attack scenario, where the adversary is aware
of the defense module and the gradients. More importantly, their released codes
show that they only upsampled the adversarial examples and did not resize
the examples back to the original size. In contrast, the clean images were not
upsampled by SR. Such leaked prior information makes the accuracy evaluation
unfair. Different from that work, our RAIN processes adversarial examples the
same as clean images. we apply SR to recover the details of the input images
to remedy accuracy drop, and we evaluate our RAIN also in the white-box
scenarios.
The performance decline on clean images is the cost of enhanced robustness.
The trade-off between adversarial robustness and accuracy on clean images was
reported in [29]. Consecutively, a theoretical explanation was given in [32], claim-
ing that the trade-off exists due to the features learned by robust models and
accurate models are fundamentally different, whereas they also did not propose
a solution to improving the trade-off either.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we enhance the robustness and at the same time maintain the
accuracy of given CNNs by proposing a RAIN framework. The RAIN contains
a structured randomization module and a detail generation module. The struc-
tured randomization module downsamples and shifts the input images randomly
for improved robustness. We then investigate the root of performance drop after
applying the randomization module through obersavation, experiments and anal-
ysis. We find the detail information is damaged in the randomization progress
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which leads to accuracy drop. Inspired by such findings, we devise a deep Super
Resolution model as the detail generaiton module to upsample and recover the
details loss during the structured randomization module, thus to remedy the
accuracy deduction. Last but not least, the evaluation experiments conducted
on the STL10 and ImageNet datasets confirm the robustness improvement and
maintained accuracy of our proposed framework.
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